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Abstract 
The aim of this article is to analyze the complex roots of Carl Schmitt’s theory on dictatorship in 
the classical world through the lens of classical receptions. It argues that Schmitt was deeply 
engaged with the classical tradition in formulating his theory on dictatorship. Knowingly or 
unknowingly, Schmitt legitimates his theory through a foundation in both the Roman idealization 
of the virtuous dictators of the early Republic as well as the long tradition of the narrative of the 
enlightened sovereign as a guarantor of law, present in both Greek and Roman antiquity and in 
the subsequent European tradition. Schmitt skillfully repurposed the Roman historical tradition 
on dictators but glossed over the traditional antipathy of Roman republicanism towards sovereign 
rule. The claim that this article is presenting is that even though it has been overlooked by earlier 
scholars, Schmitt was both directly and indirectly influenced by the classical tradition of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The article was written as is part of the research project ”Reinventing the Foundations of 
European Legal Culture 1934-1964” (foundlaw.org), funded by the European Research Council 
(grant number 31300). The author wishes to thank Dr Jacob Giltaij and the anonymous reviewers 
of the journal for their valuable comments. An earlier version of the article was presented at the 
2013 UK IVR Annual Conference ”Legal Theory and Legal History: A Neglected Dialogue?” 
held at Queen Mary, University of London. 
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dictatorship and utilized their mythical and symbolic dimensions in the later Roman and the 
subsequent European legal and political traditions. The reason for this omission was that Schmitt, 
like his contemporaries, belonged to one of the last generations to be groomed in the classical 
tradition of literature.  
 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this article is to analyze the complex roots of Carl Schmitt’s2 theory on dictatorship3 
in the classical world through the lens of classical receptions.4 Knowingly or unknowingly, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Reinhard Mehring, Carl Schmitt: Aufstieg und Fall (Munchen, Beck, 2009); David Cumin, 
Carl Schmitt (Paris, Cerf, 2005); Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An intellectual portrait of 
Carl Schmitt (London, Verso 2000); Andreas Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt (Darmstatt, 
Wissenschafliche Buchhandlung, 1995). For an outline of the extensive literature on Schmitt, see 
Volker Neumann, ‘Carl Schmitt (1888-1985),’ in Festschrift 200 Jahre Juristische Fakultät der 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, ed. Stefan Grundmann et al., (Berlin, De Gruyter, 2010), 733-
754.  
3 Carl Schmitt, Die Diktatur (Berlin, Duncker und Humblot, 1921), translated in English as Carl 
Schmitt, Dictatorship, transl. Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (Polity Press, Cambridge 2014); 
Carl Schmitt, Der Huter der Verfassung (Berlin, Duncker and Humblot, 1996 [1931]); Wilfried 
Nippel, ‘Carl Schmitts ‘kommissarische’ und ‘souveräne’ Diktatur. Französische Revolution und 
Römische Vorbilder’, in Ideenpolitik, ed. Harald Bluhm et al. (Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 2011); 
105-140; Hendrik Hamacher, Carl Schmitts Theorie der Diktatur und die intermediären 
Gewalten (Neuried, ars una Verlag, 2001); Andreas Kalyvas, ‘Hegemonic Sovereignty: Carl 
Schmitt, Antonio Gramsci and the constituent,’ Journal of Political Ideologies 5 (2000), 343-
3765; John McCormick, ‘The dilemmas of dictatorship: Carl Schmitt and constitutional 
emergency powers,’ Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 10 (1997), 163-188. On the 
theories of dictatorship, see E. E. Kettlet, The Story of Dictatorship: From the Earliest Times till 
Today (London, Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1937); Alfred Cobban, Dictatorship: Its History 
and Theory (New York, Haskell House Publishers, 1939); Franz Neumann, ‘Notes on the Theory 
of Dictatorship,’ in The Democratic and the Authoritarian State: Essays in Political and Legal 
Theory, ed. Herbert Marcuse (New York, The Free Press, 1957), 233-256; Raymond Aron, De la 
dictature (Paris, René Julliard, 1961); Alan Axelrod and Charles Phillips, Dictators and Tyrants: 
Absolute Rulers and Would-Be Rulers in World History (Facts on File, 1995); Andrew Arato, 
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Schmitt legitimates his theory through a foundation in both the Roman idealization of the 
virtuous dictators of the early Republic as well as the long tradition of the narrative of the 
enlightened sovereign as a guarantor of law, present in both Greek and Roman antiquity and in 
the subsequent European tradition.5 The claim that this article is presenting is that even though it 
has been overlooked by earlier scholars, 6 Schmitt was both directly and indirectly influenced by 
the classical traditions of dictatorship and utilized their mythical and symbolic dimensions in the 
later Roman and the subsequent European legal and political traditions.7 The reason for this 
omission was that Schmitt, like his contemporaries, belonged to one of the last generations to be 
groomed in the classical tradition of literature. The political and theoretical scholarship from 
Macchiavelli to the 19th century that he analyzed was written by people with similar backgrounds 
and educations, who felt it to be natural to develop their ideas using the classics as a frame of 
reference. Thus even though Schmitt’s works on dictatorship have only a few references to the 
classics, they are to a large degree its products. However, Schmitt’s interpretation was far from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘Good-bye to Dictatorship?,’ Social Research 67 (2000), 925-955; Clinton Rossiter, 
Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies (New Brunswick, 
Transaction Publishers, 2004); Melvin Richter, ‘A Family of Political Concepts: Tyranny, 
Despotism, Bonapartism, Caesarism, Dictatorship, 1750-1917,’ European Journal of Political 
Theory 4 (2005), 221-248. 
4 See, for example, Lorna Hardwick and Christopher Stray (eds.), A companion to classical 
receptions, (London, Blackwell, 2008). 
5 Andreas Kalyvas, ‘The Tyranny of Dictatorship: When the Greek Tyrant Met the 
Roman Dictator,’ Political Theory 35 (2007), 412-442. For earlier works on this genre, see 
Chantal Millon-Delson, ‘Dictature et despotisme, chez les Anciens et chez les Modernes,’ Revue 
Française D’Histoire des Idées Politiques, 6 (1997), 245-251; Claude Nicolet, ‘Dictatorship in 
Rome,’ in Dictatorship in History and Theory: Bonapartism, Caesarism, and Totalitarianism, 
ed. Peter Baehr and Melvin Richter (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
6 Notable exceptions are Wilfried Nippel, ‘H. Hamacher: Carl Schmitts Theorie der Diktatur,’ in 
H-Soz-u-Kult (September, 2004); Andreas Kalyvas, ‘Hegemonic sovereignty: Carl Schmitt, 
Antonio Gramsci and the constituent prince?’ Journal of Political Ideologies 5 (2000), 343–376. 
7 Michael Salter, Carl Schmitt: Law as politics, ideology and strategic myth, (London and New 
York, Routledge, 2012), 248-255.  
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neutral, he used the malleability of the Roman tradition to suppress the traditional antipathy of 
Roman republicanism towards single rule.  
 
Schmitt’s theory of dictatorship is a theory about the exercising of unrestrained power in a 
particular situation such as a state of emergency. Through the appointment of a dictator, a 
magistrate with nearly unrestrained powers, the state is able to defend itself against enemies both 
within and without. Schmitt divided dictatorships into two categories, commissarial and 
sovereign dictatorships. The aim of the commissarial dictatorship was to protect the constitution 
by suspending it, but the possibility of that suspension was included in the constitution as an 
emergency measure. In contrast, the purpose of sovereign dictatorship was to make a new 
constitution, to reorganize the state completely. This would lead to a contradiction in the 
constitutional situation, since the legitimacy of this action could not rest within the abrogated old 
constitution.8  
 
The way in which Schmitt utilized the classical tradition was a continuation of late nineteenth-
century classicism, the contemporary uses of the classics. This tendency sought political and 
ideological models from ancient Greece and Rome, in much the same way that the architecture 
of the time imitated and was inspired by classical precedents.9 In the case of Schmitt’s dictators, 
this idealization of classical precedents led to a misrepresentation of history in order to provide a 
fitting precedent for the theory of sovereign dictatorship.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 References to this and subsequent paragraphs may be found within the corresponding chapters.  
9 As described already by Salvatore Settis, Futuro del ’classico’, (Torino, Einaudi 2004).  
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Within the Roman historical tradition, there were actually two traditions of dictatorship that 
provided the models for Schmitt’s distinction between commissarial and sovereign dictatorships. 
The first was the tradition of dictatorship from the Roman early and middle Republic, from 500-
200 BC, which is known only from an idealized annalistic historiography. Even for the Romans, 
the events of that time were known half from legend, half from history. The dictators of this era 
were without fail virtuous and good military commanders who had saved Rome from peril. The 
second tradition of dictatorship was that from the late Republic, when the dictators Sulla and 
Caesar had used the powers of their office to eradicate their opponents and to transform Roman 
society and the state to their liking. While the aims and powers of the latter tradition were the 
model for Schmitt’s sovereign dictator, he remains mute about the historical reality behind the 
tradition. While the earlier tradition was known only from snippets of idealized historiography, 
the latter provided ample evidence of the rampant slaughter, looting, dispossession, lawlessness, 
and rape that went with the actions of, for example, Sulla. These sovereign dictators did 
transform Rome and create a new constitution for the Republic, but their actions equally led to 
massive suffering and, ultimately, the downfall of the Republic. On all this, though amply 
discussed in the literature to which he refers, Schmitt remains silent.  
 
Schmitt is considered one of the most important critics of liberalism in the twentieth century, 
mostly known as a theorist of sovereign power, but equally because of his connections with the 
Nazi regime in Germany.10 As with many similar figures, Schmitt has undergone a  kind of 
apotheosis in which his writings have been detached from their original context and are often 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10Of this massive literature see, for example, Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, ed. David 
Dyzenhaus (1998); John McCormick, Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as 
Technology (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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seen as purely theoretical studies.11 Schmitt has by and large been seen as a proponent of very 
modern reactionary tendencies that have been defined as a type of radical conservatism.12 
 
The relationship between Schmitt’s theories and the classical tradition was close and convoluted. 
Not only was he well versed in the tradition himself, but the classical tradition also strongly 
influenced the early modern political discourse that he was writing about, complicating the 
distinction between the various layers of influences. Ideas like popular sovereignty, plebiscitary 
democracy, and the sovereign power of the ruler were all much discussed within the Roman 
political and legal tradition. For Schmitt, as for innumerable others, the classics provided a set of 
tools or building blocks for the development of legal and political theory. That tradition also 
guided their theories to a certain extent in ways that are discernible only through an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 While generally his later works were more theoretical while the earlier were more historically 
and legally oriented, even some of his early works were highly theoretical. Carl Schmitt, 
Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, transl. George Schwab 
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005 [1922]). 
12 On Schmitt and his role in the contemporary discussions, see Renato Cristi, Carl Schmitt and 
Authoritarian Liberalism: Strong State, Free Economy (Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 
1998); J. Z. Muller, ‘Carl Schmitt, Hans Freyer and the radical conservative critique of liberal 
democracy in the Weimar Republic,’ History of Political Thought 12 (1991), 696–715; Jeffrey 
Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984). Schmitt’s critics have often labeled him a 
decisionist and nihilist; see, for example, W. Scheuerman, Between the Norm and the Exception: 
The Frankfurt School and the Rule of Law (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1994); David 
Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen, and Hermann Heller in 
Weimar (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997), Richard Wolin, ‘Carl Schmitt, the conservative 
revolutionary habitus and the aesthetics of horror,’ Political Theory, 20 (1992), 424-447. On the 
discussions around Schmitt, see Andreas Kalyvas, ‘Who’s afraid of Carl Schmitt?’ Philosophy 
and Social Criticism, 25 (1999), 86–125. 
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understanding of the tradition. Like many of his contemporaries, such as Hannah Arendt, Schmitt 
worked through the reinterpretation and rereading of the classical tradition.13 
 
Whilst general scholarship on single rule has tended to draw parallels between dictatorship and 
tyranny,14 understanding the convergences and differences of these historical traditions is crucial 
for an appreciation not only of Schmitt but also the historical tradition upon which his works 
relied. These parallels and convergences between Schmitt and Roman antiquity have not been 
discussed in earlier studies, despite the fact that there is an enormous and ever growing amount 
of literature on Schmitt.15 Notwithstanding this avalanche of scholarship, Antiquity’s influences 
on Schmitt’s historical understanding have received little attention in scholarship.16  
 
By analyzing the historical reconstructions presented by Schmitt and the Roman sources as 
narratives, the present article seeks to demonstrate how the formulation of a narrative becomes a 
constitutive force that has normative effects. Within the study of Roman constitutionalism, the 
normativity of historiography has already been increasingly recognized, as the understanding of 
history was often the defining element in what was considered legitimate and what was not.17 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 On the reuse of the Roman Republican political and constitutional tradition, see Joy Connolly, 
The Life of Roman Republicanism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). 
14 Kalyvas, Tyranny, 413.  
15 By some estimates, there is a new book written on him coming out each month. Neumann, 
Schmitt, 733.  
16 The remarkable exception is Nippel, Schmitt. 
17 The importance of narratives in Roman historical writing and their conception of constitution 
and law has been recognized in Jill Harries, Law and Empire in Late Antiquity (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), as well as in recent studies such as Geoffrey S. Sumi, 
Ceremony and Power: Performing Politics in Rome between Republic and Empire (Ann Arbor, 
University of Michigan Press, 2005), Matthew B. Roller, Constructing Autocracy: Aristocrats 
and Emperors in Julio-Claudian Rome (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001), and Ittai 
Gradel, Emperor Worship and Roman Religion (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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The understanding of narratives is here thus both historical and legal, as narratives of 
constitutional relevance explain not only the events and their explanations,18 but also how this 
narrative could influence the shared conviction of the constitutional possibilities available. 	  
 
 
Schmitt’s Roman Dictators 
Schmitt’s theory of dictatorship was developed through a number of works, starting from the 
1916 article Diktatur und Belagerungszustand, continuing with the 1921 book Die Diktatur, and 
later still in the 1922 book Politische Theologie, and other works.19 Schmitt defined dictatorship 
as unrestrained power in an unusual situation:  
Dictatorship is the exercise of state power freed from any legal restrictions, for the 
purpose of resolving an abnormal situation---in particular, a situation of war and 
rebellion. Hence two decisive elements for the concept of dictatorship are on one hand 
the idea of a normal situation that a dictatorship restores or establishes, and on the other 
the idea that, in the event of an abnormal situation, certain legal barriers are suspended in 
favour of resolving this situation through dictatorship.20 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The understanding of the narrativity of history is a contested issue, to put it mildly. For some 
references, see Ann Rigney, ‘History as Text: Narrative Theory and History’, in Nancy Partner 
and Sara Foot (eds.), Sage Handbook of Historical Theory (London, Sage 2012) 183-201; Frank 
Ankersmit, Meaning, Truth, and Reference in Historical Representation. (Ithaca, Cornell UP 
2012); Alun Munslow, Narrative and History (Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan 2007); Paul 
Ricoeur, Time and Narrative. Volumes I-III. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1990); 
David Carr, Time, narrative, and history, (Bloomington , Indiana University Press, 1986). 
19 Carl Schmitt, ‘Diktatur und Belagerungszustand,’ Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Strafrechtswissenschaft 38 (1916); Carl Schmitt, ‘Diktatur,’ in Staatslexikon im Auftrage der 
Görresgesellschaft (Freiburg, Herder, 1926), 1:1448; Schmitt, Dictatorship; Schmitt 1985.  
20 Schmitt, Diktatur, 1448, translated in Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward, ‘Translator’s 
introduction,’ in Schmitt, Dictatorship, xxiii.  
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The core of Schmitt’s theory was the division between commissarial and sovereign dictatorship. 
The purpose of commissarial dictatorship was to uphold and to protect the constitution and the 
state from whatever dangers or obstacles it might face. Its aim was a return to the normal state of 
affairs using unrestrained executive power. Commissarial dictatorship was therefore an 
emergency measure enshrined in the constitution. Thus even though it involved the suspension of 
the constitution, such a suspension was not only defined within the constitution itself but its 
timeframe and aims were also limited. In Die Diktatur, he uses early modern examples of 
delegated dictatorial power as the historical background for his discussion.21  
 
Sovereign dictatorship, by contrast, was aimed at reforming the state and the constitution. The 
sovereign dictator was thus a revolutionary, a leader who sought to bring about a new order. 
Because this power necessarily contained the abrogation of the constitution, its legitimation 
could hardly be derived from that same constitution. In fact, the powers of the sovereign dictator 
could not be derived from any existing institution or rule. Instead, Schmitt regarded the 
constituent power of the people as the foundation for this form of dictatorial power. Schmitt’s 
theory of constituent power was to a large degree derived from a critique of Sieyès’s idea of the 
pouvoir constituant and the debates about this concept following the French revolution.22  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Schmitt, Dictatorship, 1-33.  
22 Schmitt, Dictatorship, 112-131, esp. 121-128 on the pouvoir constituant; Hofmann, Legitimät, 
54, Kalyvas, Hegemonic, 346-350; Nippel, Schmitt, 117-119. On the concept, see also C. Klein, 
Theorie et pratique du pouvoir constituant (Paris, Puf, 1996); Pasquale Pasquino, ‘Die Lehre 
vom ‘pouvoir constituant’ bei Emmanuel Sieyès und Carl Schmitt,’ in Complexio Oppositorum: 
Uber Carl Schmitt, Berlin, Duncker und Humblot, Helmut Quaritsch (1988), 371–385. On the 
theories of Sieyès, see Emmanuel Sieyès, Qu’est-ce que le Tiers Etat? (Geneva, Librairie Droz, 
1970).  
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Both of the dictators, the commissarial and the sovereign, were characters that had their roots in 
ancient Roman history. Prior to the French revolution even the term dictator was a purely 
historical term referring to the Roman magistrate of dictator. As Schmitt noted, ever since the 
humanists of the Renaissance, scholars had developed their ideas through the classical tradition, 
but before the nineteenth century they did not develop the constitutional theory of dictatorship 
any further than that found in the Roman tradition. One of the reasons why there was little in the 
way of development of the theory of dictatorship was that early modern theory of sovereignty 
had no use for it. Thus even though the distinction between commissarial and sovereign 
dictatorship would have been evident from historical developments themselves, early modern 
authors, with the exception of Machiavelli, had no interest in the change from democracy to 
Caesarism. Schmitt argues that because ‘historical judgment is always dependent on the 
experience of its contemporary context’ and theorists of absolute monarchy relied on the idea of 
the power of the king being based on the grace of God, the background of dictatorship in popular 
sovereignty was not interesting for them.23 
 
The Roman dictator was an extraordinary magistrate who held supreme executive and military 
power, without being restricted by an appeal or provocatio (a citizen’s right to appeal to the 
people in instances of capital offences). Dictatorship was an emergency measure that was used in 
a time of crisis. Unlike other Roman magistrates, the dictator had no colleague and was solely 
responsible for all the affairs of state. However, historically it is unclear what the powers of the 
dictator actually meant at any given time. Historical accounts mention that dictators were either 
nominated by a magistrate with the commanding power of imperium (such as a consul or a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Schmitt, Dictatorship, 1-2.  
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praetor) after the Senate had first approved it, or, more rarely, elected by the comitia centuriata. 
Originally, there was a strict time limit of six months to a dictator’s tenure, but later it could be 
extended at the end of this term. However, it was customary for the dictator to resign as soon as 
his task was complete. The originally military nature of dictatorship may be demonstrated by the 
fact that he would as his first task appoint a magister equitum (literally, master of the horse) as 
his second in command. While the earliest accounts mention that a dictator would be free from 
all restraints, in the accounts from the middle republic onwards the decisions of the dictator were 
liable to be vetoed and submitted to provocatio.24 
 
There were actually two traditions of Roman dictatorship, one coming from the Early and 
Middle Republic (traditionally from roughly the 500-200 BC) and the other from the last century 
of the Republic, the first century BC. Of the first tradition of Roman dictatorship, we know 
mostly about the Roman wars, in which dictators might be selected in a desperate moment to 
ward of enemies. A famous example is the story of Cincinnatus, who in 458 BC was called from 
his small farm to lead Rome’s defense against invading neighbors. The story goes that 
Cincinnatus was plowing the field when an embassy came to fetch him. He promptly raised an 
army, conquered the enemies of Rome, resigned, and returned to his modest farm to finish 
plowing his field just over two weeks later. Idealized in the annalistic tradition and especially in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Mommsen, Römische Staatsrecht 2.141; Livius 8.33.8, 22.8, 27.6.5. Regarding the idea of 
development in the Roman constitution, see Jochen Bleicken, Die Verfassung der Römischen 
Republik, 7th ed., (Paderborn, 1995); Andrew Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999). On the provocatio, see A. W. Lintott, ‘Provocatio: 
From the Struggle of the Orders to the Principate,’ in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen 
Welt 1,2 (1972), 226-267; Michel Humbert, ‘Le tribunat de la plèbe et le tribunal du people, 
remarques sur l’histoire de la provocation ad populum,’ Mélanges de l’École Française de Rome 
100 (1988), 431-503.  
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Livy’s history of Rome, Cincinnatus and men like him were hailed as ideal Roman magistrates, 
people with no interest in power itself and who thought only of the well-being of the state.25 This 
early tradition of dictatorship was by and large a constitutional emergency measure meant for 
grave military situations where it was necessary to give nearly unlimited power to one man for 
the duration of one season’s campaigning. Because normally there were at least two Roman 
magistrates of each rank that were capable of vetoing each other’s decisions, appointing just one 
would resolve any issues in the chain of command.  
 
The second Roman tradition of dictatorship in the late Republic was markedly different. While 
the earlier annalistic tradition of dictatorship mostly concerned military matters, the new 
dictators like Sulla26 and Caesar27 were engaged mostly with civil wars. What the new dictators 
could or should do was a matter of debate, as there had, after all, been no dictators since the 
Hannibalic wars. There was thus very little precedent to which one could refer in order to decide 
what the powers and duties of a dictator were. Both Sulla and Caesar used their dictatorial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 The sheer volume of literature on Roman dictatorship is immense. For a sample, see Friedrich 
Bandel, Die römischen Diktaturen (Breslau, 1910); D. Cohen, ‘The Origins of the Roman 
Dictatorship,’ Mnemosyne (1957), 303-320; Arthur Kaplan, Dictatorships and ‘Ultimate’ 
Degrees in the Early Roman Republic 501-201 BC (New York, Revisionist Press, 1977); Marc 
de Wilde, ‘The Dictatorship and the Fall of the Roman Republic,’ Zeitschrift der Savigny-
Stiftung fur Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung130 (2013), 1-39; ibid. ‘The Dictator’s 
Trust: Regulating and Constraining Emergency Powers in the Roman Republic,’ History of 
Political Thought 33 (2012), 555-577. 
26 Ernst Badian, L. Sulla: The Deadly Reformer (Sydney, 1970); Karl Christ,  
Sulla: eine römische Karriere (Munich, 2002); Federico Santangelo, Sulla, the Elites and the 
Empire (Leiden and Boston, Brill, 2007). 
27 Standard works are Matthias Gelzer, Caesar: Der Politiker und Staatsmann (Stuttgart, Franz 
Steiner 2008 [1983]); Christian Meier, Caesar (Berlin, Severin und Siedler 1982), while more 
interesting are Luciano Canfora, Julius Caesar: The People’s Dictator (Edinburgh, EUP 2007) 
and W. Jeffrey Tatum, Always I am Caesar (Malden, Blackwell 2008). 
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powers to consolidate their power during and after the civil wars of their time. In the case of 
Sulla, this power was used to set about the wholesale murder of his opponents. Both Sulla and 
Caesar sought to refashion the Roman state and constitution, embarking on widespread reforms 
and settlement programs, transforming the Roman world politically, legally, and economically. 
The dictatorship of Sulla was even titled dictator legibus faciendis et reipublicae constituendae 
causa (roughly translatable as ‘dictator for the making of laws and the foundation of the 
republic’).  Sulla’s dictatorship and his actions were nominally legitimate, meaning that they 
were approved by both the Senate and the assembly of the people. Both of these were, of course, 
at that time, drastically reduced by the civil war and the elimination of Sulla’s opponents, 
making them little more than his tools. The stated motive of Sulla’s dictatorship was to free 
Rome from tyrants. However, historians like Plutarch have provided an account of his reign that 
is largely a narrative of terror. For example, when the Senate was assembled by Sulla to discuss 
matters of state after the defeat of his opponents in the civil wars, he simultaneously arranged for 
the execution of prisoners of war at the Circus Maximus. When a senator inquired about the 
commotion and the bloodcurdling cries, Sulla merely replied that ‘some criminals are being 
punished on my orders.’ Some six thousand Roman citizens, who were Sulla’s prisoners of war, 
were executed without trial at that time. The case of Caesar was in many ways different, but it 
could be said equally that his aim was the wholesale transformation of Rome and its constitution, 
although his transgressions of the constitution, such as his appointment of dictatorship for life, 
were more an ad hoc abrogation of the existing rules than their transformation. While Sulla was 
conservative, Caesar’s political support came from the populares and many of his reforms 
rewarded them. Both Sulla and Caesar were political and legal actors whose careers were based 
on exceptional actions, crossing the borders of conventional behavior. After the murder of 
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Caesar, Mark Antony completely abolished dictatorship in Rome by a law introduced as part of 
the political settlement between the parties.28  
 
Schmitt described how these two traditions of dictatorship were politically different, though they 
were understood to be theoretically identical. However, it is clear that for Schmitt, the Roman 
origins of dictatorship were central to understanding the theoretical development of the idea.29 
Die Diktatur contains a long excursus on the historical tradition of Roman dictatorship, which 
Schmitt divides into three phases. He refers to the extensive debate concerning whether the 
original dictatorship was mostly a tool against the plebeians in the struggle between the orders in 
the early and middle Republic and concludes that it was mostly used for giving extraordinary 
powers to military commanders in times of war, making him an extraordinary magistrate with 
the commanding power (imperium) of a king. In later developments the dictators were subject to 
the veto of the tribune of the plebs. The last dictators of this type were appointed during the 
Punic wars. While there were no dictators between the years 202 and 82 BC, Schmitt considers 
that their function was taken over by the use of Senatusconsultum ultimum, a decree of the 
Senate that provided unlimited, extraordinary powers that could be used against Roman citizens 
who were a threat to the constitutional order. In contrast to these orders, the dictatorial powers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Plutarch Sulla 82; De Wilde, Dictatorship, 4-22; Frédéric Hurlet, La dictature de Sylla: 
Monarchie ou magistrature républicaine? (Brussels, Institut historique belge de Rome, 1993); 
Martin Jehne, Der Staat des Dictators Caesar (Köln, Böhlau, 1987); Theodora Hantos, Res 
publica constituta: Die Verfassung des Dictators Sulla (Stuttgart, 1988). On the other 
extraordinary commands, see Giuliano Crifò, ‘In tema di senatus consultum ultimum,’ SDHI 36 
(1970), 1-15; Antonio Guarino, ‘Senatus Consultum Ultimum,’ in Sein und Werden im Recht: 
Festgabe für Ulrich von Lübtow, eds. W. C. Becker, M. Schnorr von Carolsfeld (Berlin, 1970), 
281-294. Kurt von Fritz, ‘Emergency Powers in the Last Centuries of the Roman Republic,’ in 
Schriften zur griechischen und römischen Verfassungsgeschichte und Verfassungstheorie, 
(Berlin 1976), 388-406. 
29 Schmitt, Dictatorship, 2.  
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given to Sulla in 82 BC and Caesar in 46 BC were different in scope and purpose, having, 
according to Schmitt, only the name in common with the old dictatorship.30 This interpretation 
was hardly Schmitt’s own: the dispute over whether there were sufficient continuities between 
the Early and Middle Republican dictatorships and the Late Republican dictatorships of Sulla 
and Caesar began long before him and continues to the present day. For example, Mommsen’s 
Staatsrecht (Roman public law, a standard work on the Roman constitution even today) 
separated these into the categories of regular magistracies and exceptional emergency powers, 
respectively.31 
 
The fact that Schmitt spent a fair amount of energy explaining the Roman tradition of 
dictatorship may be due to the popularity that Roman history enjoyed at the time. Debates on 
Caesar, Pompey, and Augustus at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth 
centuries in Germany were not purely historical discussions, they were also constitutional 
debates on the limits of imperial power and the role of military command in society. Thus when 
they were discussing ancient Rome and the leaders of Rome, they were also debating the 
precedents and models for Imperial and Weimar Germany. The emergence of modern historical 
writing about the history of ancient Rome only accelerated this development. Theodor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Schmitt, Dictatorship, 230-231. For a comparison with more recent views, see De Wilde, 
Dictatorship.  
31 De Wilde, Dictatorship, 1-6.Nippel, Schmitt, 130-131 the theory about the fundamental 
continuity of the tradition of dictatorship was only popularized by Wilcken in 1940 [Ulrich von 
Wilcken, Zur Entwicklung der römischen Diktatur, (Berlin 1940)], who argued that formally the 
later dictatorships were nearly identical and thus based on the same roots, apart from the 
elements that placed them above the existing constitutions. See also  De Wilde, Trust, 556. 
Recent scholars on the Roman Republic have pointed out how the whole concept is misleading 
as the political entity as well as the society go through such fundamental changes that there is 
little to bind them together beyond the Romans’ own belief in unity. See Harriet Flower, Roman 
Republics (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010). 
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Mommsen’s hugely influential Roman History gave, for all its critical credentials, a heroic 
picture of ancient Rome. Chief among Mommsen’s heroes was Julius Caesar, who is treated as 
an almost superhuman character. One of the primary reasons why scholars at the turn of the 
century were interested specifically in Caesar and Pompey was the fact that they personified the 
direct link that existed between the people and the leader. Such a leader used his connection with 
the people to further popular reforms, bypassing the political machinery. Debates on Caesar and 
the late Roman Republic reflected a longing for a strong leader and the fear of tyranny that 
coexisted with it. Because the historical record of the late Republic was dominated so much by 
the writings of Cicero, attitudes towards Cicero’s own political ideas were an integral part of that 
debate. For example, Mommsen was openly hostile towards Cicero and the conservative ideas he 
represented. It is clear that historical neutrality was very far removed from these debates. 
Mommsen and Eduard Meyer, whose positions were diametrically opposed, were the primary 
antagonists in this discussion. While Mommsen saw in Caesar a conquering hero that elevated 
Rome to the leading power in the world, Meyer considered the victory of Caesar over Pompey as 
the final downfall of the Republic and the introduction of despotism. Because the idealistic 
writings of Cicero about Pompey’s leadership were the foundation of Meyer’s theory, the battle 
for the history of the late Roman Republic was ultimately a battle over Cicero.32  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Theodor Mommsen, The History of Rome, vols. I-V, transl. William Purdie Dickson, 
numerous editions between 1861-1894; Eduard Meyer, Caesars Monarchie und das Prinzipat 
des Pompeius, 3rd ed., (reprint Darmstadt, 1974 [1919]); Zvi Yavetz, Julius Caesar and his 
Public Image (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983); Herbert Grziwotz, Der moderne 
Verfassungsbegriff und die ‘Römische Verfassung’ in der deutschen Forschung des 19. und 20. 
Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt a.M., 1986). Compare[with what?], for example, J.-P. Borle, ‘Pompée et 
la dictature,’ Les études classiques 20 (1952), 168-180. A similar debate emerged on the 
historical understanding of Augustus and his role as a political model. Ines Stahlmann, ‘Vom 
Despoten zum Kaiser. Zum deutschen Augustusbild im 19. Jahrhundert,’ in L’ Antichita 
nell’Ottocento in ltalia e Germania, eds. K. Christ, A. Momigliano (Bologna 1988), 318; Otto 
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The larger context of this issue was the debate about the role of leadership that emerged in 
German historical and political discussions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Much of the debate revolved around the idea of the leader as a charismatic national figure that 
transcended politics. As in the case of Mommsen and Meyer, much of that debate took place 
through historical writing, where examples and parallels from ancient and more recent history 
were used as justifications and legitimations. In addition to Schmitt, other influential scholars 
like Max Weber took part in this debate. Weber, in his 1919 Politik als Beruf and later in the 
posthumous Economy and Society discussed the issue of charisma and leadership extensively. 
What makes these discussions interesting for our purposes was the role that Caesarism played in 
them. Weber saw charisma as a great revolutionary force that could transform traditional 
societies. While much of Weber’s writings on charisma were based on the idea of religious 
influence, on the political level Weber furthered the concept of a charismatic leader (Führer) 
who dominates with popular support, where he utilized the concept of plebiscitarity (plebiszitäre 
Führerdemokratie). While Weber’s ideal types of leadership contained numerous types of 
charismatic leaders, ranging from religious prophets to military commanders and Caesarian 
leaders, the point was the transformative capacity of the leader, much like Schmitt’s sovereign 
dictator. Scholars like Nippel have pointed out that one of the reasons behind the success enjoyed 
by Hitler in overturning the Weimar constitution was the prevailing sense of crisis and the 
longing for a strong, transformative leader that would resolve the crippling political and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Hahn, ‘Das Kaisertum,’ Das Erbe der Alten VI, (Leipzig 1913), 74-77. On the late Republic, see 
Erich Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (Berkeley, University of California 
Press 1995). 
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economic crisis with the use of extraordinary measures.33 What separated the Schmittian idea of 
transformative sovereignty from the Weberian one was its close connection with the ancient 
Roman world. 
 
Parallel Worlds of History and Theory 
Though Schmitt’s theories have been seen in recent debates as purely theoretical constructions, 
they may equally be seen as a curious parallel universe to the ancient Roman world. Schmitt’s 
clearly detailed knowledge of the classical world was only strengthened by the fact that Western 
political and legal discourse was so focused on classical, especially Roman examples. These 
historical examples functioned as cultural markers that contained allusions to the virtues and 
values that the past represented or was supposed to represent. The role of example and 
exemplarity as precedent and justification was equally important in the Roman way of 
government and the use of Roman precedents in later legal and political thought. The exempla 
were often in the form of narratives about virtuous ancestors, the maiores, and as such had both a 
historical and normative character. While the Roman constitution was based on example and 
precedent, the mos maiorum (“the custom of the ancients”), Roman constitutional authority was 
very important in later key turning points of political thought like the French Revolution.34  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Wilfried Nippel, ‘Le leadership charismatique’, in Catherine Colliot-Thélène and Philippe 
Portier (eds.), La métamorphose du prince: Politique et culture dans l’espace occidental (Presses 
Universitaires du Rennes, 2014), 108-117.  
34 Michael Peachin, ‘Exemplary Government in the Early Roman Empire’, in Olivier Hekster et 
al. (eds.), Crises and the Roman Empire: Proceedings of the Seventh Workshop of the 
International Network Impact of Empire (Nijmegen, June 20-24, 2006) (Leiden, Brill 2007), 75-
93; Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, ‘Mutatio morum: the idea of a cultural revolution’, in T. Habinek 
and A. Schiesaro (eds.) The Roman Cultural Revolution (Cambridge: CUP, 1997) 3-22.  
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A closer examination reveals how much Schmitt’s theoretical concepts appear rooted in classical 
foundations. In his Political Theology, Schmitt developed the idea of popular sovereignty,35 
which was also an important theme in classical Roman law, where the power of the emperor was 
seen to be rooted in the people. In fact, in the Roman tradition the idea that the Roman state 
existed as a separate entity was an alien one, the Senatus Populusque Romanus was just that, the 
Senate and the people of Rome. Ever since the eviction of the kings, the Roman Republic had 
been founded on the principle of popular sovereignty, but a peculiar version of it. The Roman 
constitution, or what passed as the constitution, was not democratic but rather a mixed form of 
oligarchy and plebiscitary rule, a mixed constitution that was in a constant and contested process 
of change.36 Equally, the theme of plebiscitary democracy, so central to Schmitt’s thought, also 
had Roman foundations, though in a somewhat convoluted manner. The Romans had, in addition 
to the Senate, several legislative assemblies, of which the popular assembly was given the right 
to pass plebiscites that would have had the power of law in 367 BC. The struggle of the orders 
that pitted the plebs against the senatorial elite for much of the early and middle republic was 
about finding the balance of power between the oligarchs and the people. The resolution of that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 While the analysis in Die Diktatur was mostly about the relationship of dictatorship and 
popular will in the postrevolutionary debates, in Politische Theologie the sovereign has become 
an abstraction. Schmitt, Theology, 9-11; Kalyvas, Hegemonic, 349-350.  
36 Livy saw already the XII Tables as expressions of popular sovereignty with regard to laws 
(7.17.12), but how early were such sentiments is impossible to know. On the constant 
constitutional change, see Luigi Capogrossi Colognesi, Law and Power in the Making of the 
Roman Commonwealth, (Cambridge: CUP, 2014). On Roman constitutional theory and praxis 
about the role of the people, there is ample literature, for example, Wolfgang Kunkel and R. 
Wittmann, Staatsordnung und Staatspraxis der römischen Republik II, Handbuch der 
Altertumswissenschaften X.3.2.2., (München, Beck, 1995); Lintott, Constitution; Henrik 
Mouritsen, Plebs and Politics in Late Republican Rome, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2001); Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, Rekonstruktionen einer Republik: Die politische Kultur 
des antiken Rom und die Forschung der letzten Jahrzehnte, Historische Zeitschrift, Beihefte 
Neue Folge 38, (München, Oldenbourg, 2004). 
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conflict was a system of constitutional safeguards, where the plebs were protected by the 
tribunes of the plebs, who were sacrosanct and could veto any decision by any magistrate, and 
the legislative power of the plebeian or popular assembly. Another direct connection between the 
people, the law, and the ruler was the process of selecting the emperor through acclamation, 
which also fascinated Schmitt.37 What is noteworthy is that these historical examples were, even 
for the Romans themselves, normative in character, that is, ways to define the fundamental 
characteristics of the Republic and the mos maiorum that governed it. The emphasis on the 
continuity with the past and the willingness to alter the narrative of the past to conform to present 
expectations was as much a Roman as it was a later European tendency. The memory of the past 
was changed in subtle ways to conform to the present and the claim to immutability masked 
fundamental changes both in society and culture.38  
 
One form of sovereign power that was central to Schmitt’s thought, namely, the idea that the will 
of the sovereign was law and formed law, was also founded on Roman constitutional thought. 
The idea that the sovereign was a guarantor of law and justice represents an important parallel 
between Schmitt and Roman constitutional theory and practice. In Roman legal experience, the 
emperor became the supreme judge to whom people from all walks of life and all parts of the 
empire could appeal. In theory and, at times, even in practice, the Roman emperor represented a 
combination of legal aid and supreme court, an ever present and omnipotent figure who would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Lintott, Constitution. On the role of the emperor, the best guide is still Fergus Millar, The 
Emperor in the Roman World 31 BC-AD 337 (London, Duckworth, 1977).  
38 Flower, Roman Republics; Alain M. Gowing, Empire and Memory: The Representation of the 
Roman Republic in Imperial Culture (Cambridge, CUP, 2005); Uwe Walter, Memoria und res 
publica: Zur Geschichtskultur im republikanishen Rom, (Frankfurt am Main, Antike, 2004). Of 
the legal implications of mos maiorum, see Jochen Bleicken, Lex publica: Gesetz und Recht in 
der römischen Republik (Berlin; New York: de Gruyter, 1975). 
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right all wrongs and bring justice to even the lowliest of his subjects.39 The Roman emperor 
would become nearly omnipotent in that there were next to no legal restrictions on what the 
emperor could do. Ideas regarding the unfettered power of the emperor were first introduced into 
the Roman discussion by Seneca during the time of Nero,40 but they had been part of Roman 
elite culture, through Greek and Hellenistic kingship theories, since the late Republic. However, 
there were, of course, plenty of conventions about what was suitable for the emperor to do. Only 
very late in their history did the Romans abandon the principle that the emperor’s power was 
derived from the people and that the emperor was selected via a process of acclamation by the 
people, even though the people were represented by the Roman army.  
 
The parallels between Schmitt and the Roman constitutional tradition were of course not 
coincidences. Schmitt was a lawyer steeped in the German legal and historical tradition and thus 
well versed in both matters of the classical world and those of the Romanistic legal tradition.41 
However, he was also approaching the matter through French Revolutionary thought, which was 
equally captivated by Classical precedents and their implications for political and legal thought.42 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Tony Honoré, Emperors and Lawyers: With a Palingenesia of Third-century Imperial 
Rescripts 193-305 AD (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994). The two rules by Ulpian laid out the 
joining of Roman ideas of popular sovereignty and imperial sovereignty: Digest 1.4.1pr. Quod 
principi placuit, legis habet vigorem: utpote cum lege regia, quae de imperio eius lata est, 
populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem conferat; Digest 1.3.31 Princeps legibus 
solutus est.  
40 For example, Seneca, De Clementia 1.1.2. On Seneca’s theories in their context, see James 
Romm, Dying Every Day: Seneca at the Court of Nero, (New York: Knopf:, 2014). 
 
41 In the standard biographies, there are just some glimpses of this background, for example, 
Balakrishnan, Enemy 13-25.   
42 Nippel, Schmitt, 121-129 on the extent to which contemporaries made parallels between the 
Late Roman Republic and Revolutionary France, drawing on examples like Cicero’s dictum 
salus populi suprema lex (De Legibus 3.8). 
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Thus Schmitt weaves another layer into a quasi-mythical historical interpretation that plays on 
symbolic meanings of the past.  
 
Though Schmitt’s work mostly operated within a fairly recent historical tradition, that of the 
nineteenth century and, at best, back to Machiavelli, the strength of the Roman parallels is 
puzzling. Are we talking about a continuation of the European tradition that hailed from the 
Roman past or a direct inspiration of Roman literature and law? On the history of interpretations 
of the tradition of history from Machiavelli onwards, Schmitt outlines an almost constructivistic 
understanding of history where the events of the past are exploited to advance a contemporary 
theory, reminding him of ‘the biblical and mythological images in which events of the past 
reappear in a contemporary costume.’43  
 
What is clear is that Schmitt utilized the popular memory of early dictators like Cincinnatus to 
uphold the idea of a popular sovereign. However he remains silent about the other tradition, that 
of opposition towards and fear of the tyranny to which sovereign rule is prone. As Kalyvas had 
already noted, Schmitt’s distinction between the archaic form of dictatorship that preserved the 
state and the Sullan form of dictatorship that radically changed it was in fact adopted from 
Mommsen.44 The negativity of Sulla’s historical memory and the controversial character of the 
tradition of dictatorship and tyranny in the late Republic may be one of the reasons why Schmitt 
never delved deeper into the Roman tradition itself. That Roman tradition, especially in the 
understanding of the late republic and the idealization of the past, was to a large degree the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Schmitt, Dictatorship, 3. 
44 Kalyvas, Tyranny, 428. 
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creation of Marcus Tullius Cicero, one of the most central figures of Roman political and legal 
thought.45 
 
Cicero’s writings define much of the current understanding of Roman political culture. In works 
like the first book of On the Republic (De re publica), Cicero describes the Republic as the 
product of a shared conviction that prevailed amongst the virtuous aristocrats that guided it about 
a common good. Within the Roman tradition, the institution of dictatorship coexisted with a fear 
of tyranny. As noted in the discussions of Cicero’s Republic, tyranny could take many forms, 
from the tyranny of an absolute monarch to the tyranny of a mob driven by demagogues. Cicero 
equated tyranny not with an institution, or an office, but with a way of action. Thus tyranny may 
even be instituted though legislation:  
Of all laws I think that is the most iniquitous and least like a law, which Lucius Flaccus, 
the interrex, passed in regard to Sulla---that all his acts, whatever they were, should be 
ratified. For, while in all other states, when tyrants are set up, all laws are annulled and 
abolished, in this case Flaccus by his law established a tyrant in a republic.46 
Cicero was, as a traditionalist, not in principle against dictatorship. As a final form of self-
defense for the republic, dictatorship could be used to preserve the state, and, at times, 
extraordinary measures might be needed, such as the senatus consultum ultimum against 
Gracchus, a leader of the populares, that legalized killing him. His own actions against the 
Catilinian conspiracy, where he executed a number of conspirators without trial, was but one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Manfred Fuhrmann, Cicero and the Roman Republic (Oxford, Blackwell 1992); Anthony 
Everitt, Cicero (London, John Murray 2001). 
46 Cicero, De Lege Agraria 3.11.5 Omnium legum iniquissimam dissimillimamque legis esse 
arbitror eam quam L. Flaccus interrex de Sulla tulit, ut omnia quaecumque ille fecisset essent 
rata. Nam cum ceteris in civitatibus tyrannis institutis leges omnes exstinguantur atque tollantur, 
hic rei publicae tyrannum lege constituit. Translation by N. H. Watts (Loeb).  
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instance where magistrates of the late Roman republic were given or simply took extraordinary 
liberties in dealing with real or supposed enemies of the state, even though they were nominally 
protected by the provisions of the Roman constitution. The tyranny of the dictator was a form of 
controlled, or legal, tyranny.47 
 
On the whole, Roman political culture was traditionally against any kind of monarchical ruler or 
sovereign. The legacy of the expulsion of the kings and the institution of the republic made even 
the word king politically poisonous even half a millennia later. However, due to their growing 
involvement in the Greek world in the third and second century BC, the Romans became aware 
of the Greek and Hellenistic tradition of kingship. Buoyed by texts like Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 
the idea of the good king and the enlightened sovereign began to appeal to some Romans. 
Furthermore, many of the Roman rulers of the Greek East were addressed with royal epithets and 
given royal honors by their subjects. At the same time, the narrative tradition of Greek and 
Hellenistic tyrants, such as the legendary tyrants of Syracuse, and their equally legendary cruelty 
and excess, served as potent warnings against the dangers that sovereign rule could present to the 
cherished liberty of the Roman people.48  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Kalyvas, Tyranny, 426, 432. See also Jean-Louis Ferrary, ‘Cicéron et la dictature,’ in 
Dictatures, Actes de la Table ronde de Paris, 27-28 février 1984, ed François Hinard (Paris, De 
Boccard, 1988), 97-105. On Cicero’s actions, see A. Drummond, Law, Politics and Power: 
Sallust and the Execution of the Catilinarian Conspirators (Stuttgart, 1995). 
48Elizabeth Rawson, ‘Caesar’s Heritage: Hellenistic Kings and their Roman Equals,’ Journal of 
Roman Studies 65 (1975), 149-152; Kalyvas, Tyranny, 428. On the Greek tradition of tyranny, 
see Sian Lewis, Greek Tyranny (Exeter, Bristol Phoenix Press, 2009); Aristotle, Politics 
5.1313a-1315b.  
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This dilemma of the late Roman Republic probably influenced Schmitt’s theory of dictatorship. 
A small clue can be found in one of the first footnotes of Die Diktatur, where he maintains a very 
post-modern view of historical objectivity. He claimed that both Mommsen’s and Meyer’s works 
were influenced by contemporary political considerations. Mommsen was clearly pro-Caesar, 
while Meyer supported Pompey. Pupils of Mommsen and Meyer debated the role of a dictator in 
the Roman constitution in a discussion that was for Schmitt a clear reference to the contemporary 
debate over the power of the military in Germany at that time. While Mommsen had introduced 
the distinction between Republican and Caesarian dictatorship, others sought to prove that there 
was a clear separation between military and civilian powers in the Roman constitution.49  
 
Schmitt’s solution was to construct a historically inspired ideal type. He clearly knew the various 
historical traditions of sovereignty and dictatorship from Aristotle, Livy, and Cicero, but 
mentions none of them. The reason is probably not that the whole Roman historical tradition 
operated through the distinction between the good commissarial and bad sovereign dictatorship. 
It is more likely that the tradition, which Schmitt disentangles, quotes sources and names to the 
point of excess. His solution was to strip away the superfluous historical details and retain only 
the essential, and in the process reduce the historical framework to a kind of ideal type. Both 
Schmitt and his audience were familiar with this tradition and expounding it would have been 
redundant, and invited historical criticism.  
 
Reflecting the use of the classical tradition as a surrogate stage upon which contemporary 
debates were presented in classical garb, Schmitt’s dictatorship operated on a complicated 
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narrative foundation. It is evident that much of European political thought, up to the French 
revolution, was observed and classified through the lens of the historical tradition regarding 
Roman dictatorship. While objectifying the past to serve as an idealized continuation of a 
convenient juxtaposition of various forms of dictatorship, historical examples are organized as a 
foundational narrative for the political theory that Schmitt was seeking to legitimize.   
 
 
Conclusions 
Symbols and myths are powerful elements in legal, historical, and political discourse. The 
purpose of this article was to analyze the complex interaction between the historical, mythical, 
and symbolic dimensions of Carl Schmitt’s theory of dictatorship and the classical Roman 
tradition of history. Comparing Schmitt’s writings on dictatorship with Roman historical sources 
and the earlier historiographical tradition, on the surface it is evident how Schmitt both uses the 
legitimacy of the Roman tradition to address contemporary concerns but also criticizes his 
predecessors of the same bias. However, what emerges is a picture of a multi-layered process 
where historical figures and symbols are being recycled and repurposed again and again to 
reconfigure the legal and political legacy of Roman dictatorship for new usages. 
 
There were numerous ancient and modern traditions of dictatorship and tyranny in the classical 
world, as can be seen in ancient authors like Aristotle, Cicero, Livy and in modern historical 
debates on sovereign rule in Antiquity. Schmitt’s theory of dictatorship was informed and 
influenced by not only his reading of ancient sources, but also by contemporary historical 
debates on Antiquity and the symbolic value of the past. As a scholar, Schmitt was acutely aware 
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of the central role played by myths and symbols in legal discourse as constitutive and 
legitimating elements.  
 
This article has argued that Schmitt’s theories utilized a number of sometimes contradictory 
narrative traditions of dictatorship and sovereign rule in the ancient world. In his works, Schmitt 
used the cultural references that these had both in the classical world and the Western political 
and legal tradition. Furthermore, the classical tradition functioned as a kind of parallel narrative 
to Schmitt’s theoretical framework.  
 
Schmitt’s theory of dictatorship was based on the division between commissarial and sovereign 
dictatorships. The idea of a dictatorship was that it would be an emergency measure that operated 
within the constitution where unrestricted power was given to a magistrate to protect the state 
from serious threats. A commissarial dictatorship would operate by temporarily suspending the 
constitution, but the suspension would be carried out according to measures enshrined within it. 
In contrast, a sovereign dictatorship would aim at reorganizing the state and remaking the 
constitution itself. This theory rested to a large degree on a creative reinterpretation of the two 
Roman traditions of dictatorship. The first tradition was that of the idealized dictators of the early 
Roman Republic, who, according to annalistic historiography, had saved Rome during troubled 
times. These men were without fail virtuous, ideal characters that were above politics and self-
interest. The second tradition of dictatorship, of the late Republic, was much more controversial, 
as dictators like Sulla or Caesar had operated largely on the basis of self-interest and their own 
desire for political power. Schmitt uses the historical memory of the “good” dictators to present 
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an ideal version of commissarial and sovereign dictators, a precedent suitable for his own 
political agenda.  
 
Myths and symbols have a tendency to make the writing of history complicated. That is due to 
the fact that they often carry so much inherent baggage that any analysis can be skewed or may 
even end up wandering around a hall of infinite mirrors. Thus the historical memory of Roman 
dictators, quasi-mythical, heroic figures that exerted a profound influence on European political 
and legal thought, were transformed in Carl Schmitt’s thinking, making him a mythogenetical 
political and legal philosopher in his own right.  
 
Schmitt’s historical understanding and influences have been (apart from a few exceptions) 
overlooked. However, Schmitt’s theories of dictatorship were grounded in a particular reading of 
history, both of the history of the ancient Roman world and the intellectual history of 
scholarship. Within these traditions, the concept of dictatorship has a strong symbolic and even 
mythical dimension, since the classical past, by its very definition, operates in a nearly mythical 
register. 
